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IN THE S·UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R ... \CHEL P. Ll~:NT and DILWORTH 
STRASSER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GEORGE W. KITCHENS, ALBION 
L. KITCHENS, and MINNIE E. 
KITCHENS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7871 
The right of way involved in this case is situate on 
the south side of 4th South Street between 4th and 5th 
East Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. It has a frontage. 
of ten feet and extends South ninety-nine feet. It is 
over and across the West ten feet of the North ninety-
nine feet of the appellant's property. Respondent's 
property adjoins the right of way on the West. 
It was the contention of the appellants during the 
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trial of the case that the use of the right of way by the 
respondents and their predecessors in interest was per-
missive. The respondents contended and the court found 
that the respondents had used the right of way since 
1920 openly, continuously, uninte-rruptedly, adversely 
and under a claim of right. This issue is the crux of the 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellants first point relied upon for reversal 
of the District Court is "That the court erred in finding 
any prescriptive easement in favor of respondents," and 
this point is divided into three subdivisions, namely: 
"(A). The applicable presumptions favor appel-
lants. 
(B). The motion to dismiss the coun terclairn 
should have been granted. 
(C). If appellants' e·vidence he believed, there 
was no acquiescence by predecessors of 
appellants." 
We will discuss these matters in the order in which 
they were discussed in the appellants' Brief. 
Counsel for the respondents have no quarrel with 
the authorities set out in the app~ellants' Brief at pages 
22 to 39. The authorities there cited establish the rule 
that in the absence of any evidence of an adverse use, 
there is a presumption that the use was permissive. In 
the opinion of this court, in Harkness v. Woodmansee, 
7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 at 293, this court stated the rule 
in the following language: 
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.. \\""here a person opens n \vny for the use of 
his o"~n preinises, and other persons use it also 
'Yithout causing damage, the presumption is, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such 
use by the latter 'Yas permissive, and not under 
a claim of right.., 
The same rule 'Yas announced by this court in Cache 
Valley Banking Companyv. Cache Co·unty Poultry Grow-
ers ... -1ssociation, ____ (Utah) ----, 209 P. 2d 251 at 255 and 
256: 
.. If the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
finding that the usage 'vas adverse and with the 
claim of right on the part of the claimant and 
its predecessors and was not by permission of 
the owner then the judgment must be affirmed 
otherwise it must be reversed." 
See also, Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Com-
pany, 111 Utah 471, 184 P. 2d 211, and Zollinger v. 
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714. 
The authorities referred to above and those cited 
in the appellant's Brief establishes that presumptions 
fade into oblivion in the face of direct positive evidence 
of an adverse use. 
The question then presents itself, was there any 
evidence that the use of the right of way by the respond-
ents and their predecessors in interest was adverse and 
under claim of right. 
George W. Kitchens, a witness for the respondents, 
testified that he had been familiar with the use of the 
right of way since 1920 (R. 15) and that the right of 
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way had been used by the respondents and their prede-
cessors in interest from 1920 to 1946 continually and 
without any interruption and for every purpose (R. 
27, 28). That in 1946, tenants of the appellants built 
a gateway across the driveway, and that he went down 
and moved the gate (R. 29). 
Minnie Kitchens Packard testified that she was liv-
ing with her mother at the time her mother purchased 
the property adjoining the right of way on the West, 
and continued to live with her for two years (R. 48, 49), 
and that during that time, the driveway was used for 
bringing in coal and wood and when people, friends 
and relatives came in cars, they parked in the road 
and that "it was used constantly as ours." (R. 4.9). 
That in 1923, she moved to the southern part of Salt 
Lake City but visited her mother all of the· time. That 
during the past 30 years, she and her family had used 
the driveway, and had put ashes on the driveway when 
it became muddy and rutty (R. 52). 
An Abstract of Title covering the respondents' 
property was admitted in evidence as Defendants' Ex-
hibit "1." Entry 30 of Exhibit "1" is an abstract of a 
quit-claim deed from Carrie E. Weidner to Willie Ann 
Kitchens dated May 15, 1936 and recorded in the Re-
corder's office for Salt Lake County, Utah, May 18, 
1936 in Book 159 at page 75 and describing the right 
of way in question (R. 13). (Res. Ex. ''1"). 
The Abstract of Title covering the appellants' prop-
erty was also introduced in evidence· at least in so far 
as Entry 16 thereof is concerned (R. 11). Entry 16 
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of that .. A.bstract i~ an abstraet of a \\1 arranty Deed fron1 
Carrie E. ,,~ eidner to Fred E. Weidner and Bessie 
Evelyn Ferguson as tenants in common and not as joint 
tenants, dated Decen1ber ~7, 1934, and recorded in the 
Recorder's office for Salt Lake County, Utah December 
27, 193-± in Book 1-±3, at page 144, describing the appel-
lants property \vithout reference to the respondents' 
right to use the right of \Yay in question. 
While it is true that the Warranty Deed to Fred 
E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn Ferguson was made and 
recorded in 1934 and the Deed of the right of way to 
~Irs. Kitchens \Yas made and recorded in 1936, yet the 
fact that Mrs. Weidner executed and delivered the 
Quit-Claim Deed establishes beyond any doubt that the 
use of the right of way for sixteen years prior to the 
delivery of the Deed was under a claim of right, and 
this. becomes even more impressive in the light of the 
testimony of Fred E. Weidner, a witness for the appel-
lants. Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified that his mother 
had an interest in the property in question until the 
time of her death, and that there was no consideration 
other than a moral consideration for the execution and 
delivery of the Deed (R. 93, 94). 
As further proof that the use of the right of way 
by the respondents was adverse and under claim of right, 
the will of Carrie E. Weidner provided, "I also want 
Mrs. W. A. Kitchens to have a ten foot by 99 foot drive-
way on the West side of my lot." (Res. Ex. "4"; R. 106). 
The respondents do not base their claim to a pre-
scriptive right of way either on the Quit-Claim Deed 
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to Mrs. Kitchens nor upon the will of Mrs. Weidner but 
the Quit-Claim Deed and the will establish beyond the 
question of a doubt that the use of the right of way 
by the respondents and their predecessors in interest 
was adverse and under a claim of right. 
There is, of course, some evidence introduced by 
the appellants and referred to in their Brief, that the 
use was permissive·. We respectfully submit that the 
great preponderance of the evidence established the 
fact that the use was open, continuous, without inter-
ruption, adverse and under claim of right, and therefore 
the District Court properly resolved this issue in favor 
of the respondents. 
Subsection "B" of the appellants first point relied 
upon for a reversal is that the Appellants Motion to 
Dismiss the Counter-claim should have been granted. 
c·ounsel argues that the motion should have been grant-
ed because the presumptions favor the appellants and 
that the evidence of the appellants establishes that the 
use was permiSSive. 
We have heretofore pointed out that presumptions 
have no application whatsoever in a case where there 
is direct positive evidence of an adverse use. It may 
well be that some of the evidence of the appellants was 
that the use was permissive, but we have heretofore 
pointed out that the respondents evidence which the 
court believed was that the use was adverse and under 
claim of· right. 
Referring to subsection "C" to-wit: "If appellants' 
evidence be believed, there was no acquiescence by 
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predecessors of appellants,,, it appears to counsel for 
the respondents that a eo1nplete answer to the appel-
lants' argument in this part of their Brief is that the 
evidence of the appellants "~as in direct conflict with 
the evidence of the respondents and that the court found 
the issue in favor of the respondents, which carries the 
inference that the court did not believe the evidence 
introduced for and on behalf of the appellants . 
. A .. case very similar to the case at bar was recently 
before this court in the case of Buckley v. Cox, 1952, 247 
P. (2) 277. In that case, the Plaintiff brought an action 
to quiet title to a driveway. It was the contention of the 
Plaintiff and he introduced evidence in support thereof 
that the use of the driveway by the Defendant was per-
missive. The Defendant contended and introduced evi-
dence in support of his contention that his use of the 
driveway was adverse and under claim of right. 
There was a direct conflict between the evidence of 
the Plaintiff and the evidence of the Defendant and the 
court resolved the issue in favor of the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant appealled upon the ground that the 
Plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to support the find-
ing of the trial court. In its opinion, this court said: 
"Under the criteria set out in Norback v. 
Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d, 339, this 
action is one at law. Hence if there is any com-
petent evidence in the record to support the 
court's findings the judgment should not be dis-
turbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 475, 
290 P. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 307, 231 
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P. 112. This principle is well stated in Jensen v. 
Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d, 1070, 1072: 
"As this is a law action, the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported the 
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether 
the decision made by the trial court finds support 
in the evidence. If there is competent credible evi-
dence to support the findings made by the trial 
court, then those findings should stand." .... 
"The evidence as revealed by the record is 
conflicting. It is sufficient to support a decision 
for either party. The trial judge saw and heard 
all the witnesses and viewed the exhibits. He 
found that the use by defendant was permissive 
and not adverse. Since competent evidence in the 
record supports the court's finding and judg-
ment, we may not disturbe the latter. S.ee cases 
supra." 
APPELLANT'S POINT No. 2 
Counsel for the appellants complain that the drive-
way should be used only to the extent that the owner-
ship and occupancy of the respondents property adjoin-
ing on the west requires, and in support of their con-
tention, they referred to the testimony of Mr. G. W. 
Kitchens that "he owns property adjoining 414 East 
Fourth South to the west and then to the South, and that 
he intends to operate all of the property as a motel, 
intending to drive cars used for other portions of the 
motel down the driveway and park them in the rear of 
414 East Fourth South." (R. 40). 
We would like to point out that the testimony of 
one of the witnesses could not in any way alter or affect 
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the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of the court and their Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
La\v and the Decree did not grant to the respondents the 
right to use the drive\vay in connection with the use of 
any property other than the property at 414 East F·ourth 
South. Paragraph four of the Findings of Fact pro-
vides: 
"±. That the Defendants are the owners of 
an easen1ent consisting of a right of wa-y over 
and across the said premises of the -Plaintiff 
described in Finding No. 3," appellants property. 
"The purposes for passing over the same with 
or without horses, wagons, automobiles, trucks 
and other vehicles and in any and all other 
reasonable manner and for the ingress to and 
egress from the premises of the Defendants above 
described in Finding number two, which said 
easement and right of way have been used by the 
Defendants and their predecessors in interest 
openly, adversely, continuously, uninterruptedly 
and under claim of right for a period of more 
than twenty-five years last past, and the same 
is appurtenant to the said above described prem-
ises used by the Defendants as aforesaid." (R. 
109). 
The Decree of the District Court provides as fol-
lows: 
"2. That the Defendants, George W. Kitch-
ens, Albion L. Kitchens and Minnie E. Kitchens 
are the owners of an easement and right of way 
over and across that portion of the premises 
of the Plaintiff above described for the purposes 
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of passing over the same with or without wagons, 
automobiles, trucks and other vehicles and in any 
and all other reasonable manner and for ingress 
to and egress from the premises of the Defend-
ant hereinafter described, which easement and 
right of way is described as follows:" (A descrip-
tion of the easement follows) (R. 112). 
Paragraph three of the court's Decree describes 
the property belonging to the respondents and adjoin-
ing the right of way on the west. The Decree provides 
that the right of way shall be appurtenant to the Defend-
ant's property and limits the use to the use and occu-
pancy of respondents' property adjoining the right of 
way on the west. 
It will thus be seen that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of the District court 
limit the use of the right of way in exactly the manner 
that the appellants desire and there is therefore, no need 
for any complaint on that score by the appellants. 
APPELLANT'S POINT No. 3 
The appellants third point of error is that it would 
be an enlargement of .the prescriptive right to give 
the respondents the right to drive from the right of way 
in question on to the respondents' lot in the rear of the 
respondents' home. 
We concede that the prescriptive right cannot be 
enlarged if it thereby imposes a greater burden on the 
servient estate. We contend also and the cases cited 
by the appellants hold that the use may be enlarged 
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if it does not in1pose a greater burden on the servient 
estate. The rule is stated in 1+ Cyc. 1193 as follows: 
~' .... -\.Iterations ""hich do not Inaterially increase 
the servitude will not extinguish the right." 
Prior to the time when the fence on the west side 
of the right of 'Yay in question was torn down, it was 
necessary for cars and trucks using the right of way for 
delivery of various commodities to unload and then 
either to back out of the driveway or drive onto the 
appellants' rear lot and turn around. The evidence shows 
that during the prescriptive period people came to 
deliver all manner of things, visitors came to see them, 
and all who lived in 414 over the prescriptive period 
made use of the driveway. The fence was on the Kitch-
ens property running north and south with a gate near 
the coal shed. During the prescriptive period they drove 
their cars into the driveway down to or near the gate, 
left them parked in the driveway and went through the 
gate into Kitchens lot. A concrete walk from the house 
to the gate was there when Kitchens moved in (R. 59). 
Kitchens always claimed the right to use the right of 
way but they never claimed a right to park east of the 
right of way on the Weidner property. At times they 
wanted to get out of the driveway and so asked per-
mission to park behind the Weidner property. That 
was east of the driveway. The fence was on the Kitch-
ens property. When the fence was taken down it did 
not cast any additional burden on the Weidner property. 
In fact it relieved the burden. When cars are driven 
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1n and deliveries are made they do not have to park 
the cars and trucks in the driveway as they had done 
for more than the prescriptive period but they can drive 
off the right of way on to the Kitchens property, turn 
around and drive out. The W eidners never did have 
anything to do with the fence on the west side of the 
right of way. The use with the fence down will relieve 
the burden on the servient estate. 
It is of no concern of the appellants that Kitchens 
took down his own fence. The Kitchens family could 
have taken it down anytime and it would have made no 
difference to the appellants, except to relieve the servient 
tenement of some of its burden. 
The appellants argue on page 45 of their Brief, 
that one way in which the servient estate would be 
burdened by permitting the respondents to drive from 
the right of way on to the rear of their lot, was that 
George Kitchens planned to operate a motel on the 
corner and planned to use the right of way in question 
in connection with the use of the entire corner. We have 
heretofore pointed out that the Decree of the District 
Court grants no such right or privilege to the respond-
ents. 
APPELLANT'S POINT No. 4 
In support of the appellants' fourth point of errort 
it is stated that the only question raised by a Motion 
for a New Trial is "Whether the· Affidavit of Eloise 
Bowden presented material evidence which might alter 
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the result." \Ve find ourselves in complete disagree1nent 
'vith this staten1ent of the la,v. 
In order to entitle a party to a new trial upon the 
grounds of newly discovered evidence, the evidence 
must not be merely cumulative and where the case is 
tried to the court without a jury, it n1ust appear that if 
such evidence "~as produced at the trial of the case the 
court's Findings would have been different. H eichm.er 
v. Peterson, 75 Utah 107, 111, 283 P. 432. Larson v. 
Ones£te, 21 lTtah 38, 59 P. 234. 
Let us therefore, examine the record and see whether 
the evidence which the appellants offered in support 
of their motion for a new trial is cumulative. 
The affidavit of Eloise Bowden filed in support of the 
appellants' motion for a new trial states that she is the 
daughter of Bessie Weidner F'erguson and that she lived 
in the Weidner house from April, 1937 to the fall of 
1939. That she was present when a conversation occurred 
between :Jirs. Kitchens and her grandmother, Mrs. Weid-
... ner. That Mrs. Kitchens said to the affiant, "I am giving 
your grandmother this dollar in front of you Eloise, so 
that if anything ever comes up concerning the driveway, 
you can say I paid for the use of it;" that on another 
occasion just before Christmas in 1939, Mrs. Kitchens 
gave the affiant one dollar and asked her to give it to 
her grandmother in the hospital in payment of the agree-
ment, that one dollar a year be paid for the use of the 
right of way. That in April, 1937, the affiant and her 
husband installed a telephone in that part of the Weid-
ner house in which they lived and on several occasions 
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Mrs. Kitchens brought over bread and puddings "to 
pay for the driveway." That from April 1937 to the 
tilne when the affiant moved in 1939, the driveway was 
used by Mrs. Kitchens and her family only for making 
delivery of coal, except when Mrs. Kitchens grandson 
was home on furlough and when he asked for permission 
to park his car on the Weidner property. The affiant's 
husband gave him permission. That in the summer of 
1924 the affiant lived with her grandparents and that 
the driveway then was used only for making delivery 
of coal. That in about the year 1933, after the death of 
Mr. Weidner, Mrs. Weidner rented a part of the home 
to a family with a little girl, and to accommodate the 
family, a gate was put up across the driveway and that 
the gate remained for at least six months. 
The testimony of Eloise Bowden is all cumulative. 
Mr. Fred Weidner, a witness for the appella:nts, testi-
fied as follows : 
"Q. Did you ever have any conversation with 
any of the Kitchens people about the use of 
that driveway~ 
A. Oh, indirectly. 
Q. When~ 
A. I called up Mrs. Kitchens one time and asked 
if she would call my mother to the phone. 
I said, "I hate to bother you." 
She said, "Oh, don't think about that, you let 
us use your driveway and that is in payment 
of the telephone calls." ( R. 86). 
He also testified that his mother had an understand-
ing with Mrs. Kitchens that she could use Mrs. Kitchens 
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phone and Mrs. Kitchens ""ould call her to the phone 
for the use of the drive,vay ( R. 89). 
The statement of the affiant that between April, 1937 
and the time 'Yhen the affiant moved in 1939 that the 
driV"e,Yay "~as used only for the delivery of coal, except 
when Mrs. Kitchens' grandson was home on furlough, is 
also cumulative. ~Ir. Fred E. Weidner so testified (R. 
85). Her statement that in 1924 the driveway was used 
only for the delivery of coal is also cumulative. Mr. 
Fred E. " ... eidner so testified ( R. 96). 
Her statement that in 1933 a gate was put across 
the driveway and that it remained for at least six 
months is cumulative, for both Mr. Weidner and Mrs. 
Ferguson so testified (R. 85, 99). 
We respectfully submit that the record establishes 
beyond a doubt that the evidence offered in support of 
the appellants motion for new trial was all cumulative 
and therefore the motion was properly denied. 
This court has repeatedly held that in order to en-
title a person to a new trial upon the grounds of newly 
discovered evidence, diligence must have been shown 
to produce such evidence at the time of trial. Vandyke v. 
Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 P. 50. Shields v. 
Ekman, 67 Utah 474,248 P. 128. 
There is not one single statement or allegation of 
anyone in the record that diligence had been used to 
uncover the testimony of Eloise Bowden and to present 
it at the trial of the case. On the contrary, the record 
leads one to the conclusion that if diligence had been 
used, the testimony of Eloise Bowden would have been 
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uncovered long before the time of the trial. Eloise 
Bowden is the daughter of Bessie Weidner F·erguson, 
and a granddaughter of Mrs. Weidner. It appears from 
her affidavit that she lived at the Weidner residence in 
1924 and from 1937 to 1939, and it appears further that 
she had some knowledge of the installation of a gate 
in 1933. Bessie Weidner Ferguson was a witness for 
the appellants, and a simple inquiry directed to Mrs. 
Ferguson would have uncovered the fact that her daugh-
ter, Eloise Bowden, had lived in the Weidner home 
during the periods mentioned and had some knowledge 
which had a bearing on the outcome of this case. 
We respectfully submit that the newly discovered 
evidence offered in support of the appellants' motion 
for a new trial was cumulative; that it would have had 
no bearing on the outcome of the trial and that the 
record does not disclose that any diligence was used 
to uncover the testimony of Eloise Bowden, but on 
the contrary, the record discloses that if the slightest 
diligence had been used, such testimony would have 
been discovered. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the records show by 
the great preponderance of evidence that the respond-
ents and their predecessors in interest have used the 
driveway in question openly, continuously, adversely, 
uninterruptedly and under a claim of right since 1920 
and by reason thereof, the respondents have acquired a 
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prescriptive right to use said driveway within the limita-
tions set out in the Decree of the District Court. 
We further respectfully submit that since the testi-
mony of Eloise Bowden was merely cumulative, and 
since the appellants have not shown any diligence what-
soever in uncovering her testimony, the District Court 
ruling on the appellants motion for a new trial should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
w. G. HOWELL AND 
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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